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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the surety in executing an official bond is presumed to know the terms
7
of the statute under which he executed the bond.'
In certain respects the case is unusual; it is a strong holding in
that the statute specifically provided that the bond be "not more than
$15,000"; and it was decided on the basis of estoppel, which basis
might be seriously questioned since it is difficult to see wherein the
surety was estopped as to the state.
It is of especial interest to note that the case involved a summary
proceeding under the statute. The summary remedy has been declared constitutional in North Carolina,' 8 but its use has been denied
where the penalty superseded the statute19 as in the present case, the
reason assigned by the court being that since the bond was not in
conformity with the statute, it was not a statutory bond to which the
summary remedy would apply. As there is-no essential difference
between the then existent statute on summary remedy 20 and the one
now in force, the present case is apparently a direct reversal of the
previous holding.
FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.
Taxation-Discriminatory License Classifications--Limitations
of Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses.
The 1931 General Assembly of North Carolina imposed a license
tax of $50 per truck upon persons, firms or corporations who sell
fresh fish, fruits or vegetables and who do not maintain a permanent
place of business in the State, but exempted persons, firms or cor' See Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 264 S. W. 879; 880 (1929) (school contractor's bond) ; Crawford v. Ozark Insurance Co., 97 Ark. 549, 134 S. W. 951,

952 (1911) (statutory bond) ; 9 C. J. 34, §56.
"Anonymous Case, 2 N. C. 29 (1794) (judgment against receivers of public
monies); Oats v. Darden, 5 N. C. 500 (1810)

(summary remedy against

a

sheriff); Broughton v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 380 (1867) (summary proceeding
against sureties for Clerk and Master in Equity).
" State Bank v. Twitty; Henderson v. Matlock; Governor v. Witherspoon,
all s=pranote 5.
'Acts of North Carolina Assembly of 1795, c. VIII, §5: "And be it further
enacted that when any constable or constables in any county within this state
shall or may have received any money in virtue of his office or appointment as
constable, and shall fail to pay the same to the person or persons entitled to
receive it, that then and in that case it shall and may be lawful upon motion
made in the court of the county in which said constable resides for said court
to give judgment against said constable or constables and his or their securities
for all sum or sums of money so received and collected, together with costs,
and to award execution thereon in the same manner as other executions issuing
from said court, provided, such constable has ten days previous notice of such
motion...."
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porations selling these products if they are grown in this State or
the fresh fish taken in the waters of this State.' A specially constituted three-judge federal court declared the tax unconstitutional since
it discriminates against the products of other states and so constitutes
a burden upon interstate commerce. 2 It is surprising that, in face
of many emphatic decisions enforcing this constitutional prohibition
of State legislation discriminatory against other States' products,
such legislation actuated by local interests and flagrantly violative of
the commerce clause is still enacted. This tax which is so clearly

discriminatory raises the question of discrimination in license taxes
generally.

License classifications which discriminate against either products3

of other States or residents 4 of other States are promptly condemned
by the courts. The equal protection of laws and the equal privileges
and immunities clauses which prohibit legislation aimed at non-resident persons have augmented the commerce clause to prevent the
States from harassing each other with rival and spiteful measures.
A State may tax the sale within its borders of produce brought from
other States if the tax applies impartially to produce from within as
well as from without the State,5 and it may tax business within the
State conducted by non-residents, but the tax must not be unlike that
imposed upon business conducted by residents.0
When interstate commerce and non-resident considerations are not
involved in the classification, the courts recognize considerable discretion in the legislature to classify business for license taxes. De'N. C. PuB. LAws (1931) c. 427, §121Y2. "The Finance Committee several
times rejected a tax proposal similar to this, but in the long, drawn-out session
this modified section was enacted." Commissioner of Revenue A. J. Maxwell,
U. S. Daily, Aug. 22, 1931, at 1430. Merchants in several South Carolina towns
threatened to boycott North Carolina goods in protest against the tax.
'Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931). Suit to enjoin
the Revenue Commissioner from enforcing the act. Complainant operated
trucks selling South Carolina peaches in North Carolina. A temporary restraining order was obtained from the District Judge and an interlocutory injunction
granted by the three-judge court. No appeal was taken.
'Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347 (1875); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, 26 L. ed. 565 (1880) ; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446,
29 L. ed. 691 (1886). Nor may a tax discriminate against the products of the
taxing State. State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59, 42 Ati. 973 (1899).
"Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 41 Sup. Ct. 571, 65 L. ed.
1029 (1921), reversing 178 N. C. 399, 100 S.E. 693 (1919).
'Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93, 64 L. ed. 157
(1919).
Chalker v. Birmingham and N. W. Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 39 Sup. Ct. 366,
63 L. ed. 748 (1917).
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cisions under the equal protection of laws clause require that persons
who are similarly situated shall be similarly taxed.7 Although the
North Carolina constitutional provision for taxation by a uniform
rule8 applies expressly only to taxes on property, 9 the decisions have
established the rule that a license tax not uniform upon persons in
substantially the same situation is inconsistent with the intent so apparent in the provision and that its collection would be restrained as
unconstitutional. 10 As such equality is guaranteed under the federal
constitution, these decisions do not promulgate a new rule. The requirement of reasonable classification is satisfied when the court can
conceive that the legislature could regard the classification as having
1
a "connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers. " Thus, differences in types of business, volume of business, opportunities
afforded the business, or burdens which the business places upon
government are held to afford reaonable bases for classification,
whereas personal attributes would not justify classification. The
differences may be minute; they are invalid only when they are
palpably arbitrary.
This equality which the courts require may be termed "formal
equality," for a classification is legal if there is a genuine difference in
business organization. This difference may not actually be an economic justification for the dissimilar tax treatment which results.
For example, it is legal to impose a license tax on hand laundries
without imposing one on steam laundries. 12 The legislature may
select a number of businesses for special taxes, and because those
types of business are unlike others in external appearances they are
legally subject to a tax not imposed on the others. In the 1931
Revenue Act license taxes are laid on piano dealers 13 and radio
dealers,' 4 while there is not a tax on furniture dealers; manufacturers
226 U. S.184, 33 Sup. Ct. 47, 57 L. ed. 180 (1912).
Toyota
'
See C.
Art. V, §3.
CoNsT.,v. Hawaii,
'N.
73 S.E. 1000 (1912).
'State v. Williams, 158 N. C. 610, (1878)
; Worth v. Petersburg Ry. Co., 89
" Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119
N. C. 301 (1883) ; State v. Carter, 129 N. C. 560, 40 S.E. 11 (1901) ; State v.
Williams, supra note 9; Tea Company v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145, 144 S.E.
701 (1928).
'See American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S.89, 21 Sup. Ct.
43, 45 L. ed. 102 (1900).
" Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S.59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192, 56 L. ed. 192
(1912).
"N.C.Pun. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §147a.
"N. C. PuB. LAws (1931) c. 427, §147d.
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of ice cream 15 and of bottled drinks1 6 are taxed, while other manufacturers are not; a tax is imposed on electricians, plumbers and gasfitters, 17 but not on carpenters or brickmasons. Here is a departure
from a natural interpretation of equality.
It appears that this system of taxes in North Carolina has developed from a few fees imposed in 1715 for regulation of "Ordinary
Keepers and Tippling Houses," and in 1752 extended to "Traders,
Peddlers and Petty Chapmen,"' 8 with random and illogical additions
to the present time. A license system framed judiciously would seem
to have a valuable function in a revenue system. There is a group of
occupations which the State desires to restrict, and to accomplish this
it imposes a heavy tax upon them.1 9 Again, there are enterprises in
which State inspection is considered necessary, and a license fee can
be imposed to defray this expense.2 0 Also, where an occupation
causes the State an extra expense not connected with inspection a
license tax can be used for reimbursement. 2 1 License taxes can be
utilized to correct inequalities in taxation. There are some enterprises which have very little taxable property but which nevertheless
earn large profits, and the license tax is a way to offset this escape
from other taxes.2 2 These latter enterprises which cause extra expense or which escape other taxes present peculiar differences from
other forms of business as taxpayers, and to require a special tax
from them is not a departure from equality. The use of a license
tax merely to curtail an undesired activity is a departure from actual
equality, and it is a questionable use of the taxing power.
If there is to be more than a formal equality in license taxes, the
system should be confined to enterprises with real differences of obli"N. C. PUB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §161.
'N.
C. Pu. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §134.
'N.

C. PUB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §155.
HISTORY OF TAXATION IN NORTH

UPARKER,

LONIAL PERIOD

371-375.

"Among

(1928) 129.

CAROLINA DURING THE CO-

CLARKE, LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, Vol.

23, p. 79,

these are phrenologists, fortune tellers, peddlers, employment

agents, trading stamps. N. C. PuB. LAWS (1931) c. 427 §116, §124, §121, §154,
§156.

'Licenses on hotels, restaurants, soda fountains and barber shops would
come within this classification. N. C. PUB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §126, §127,
§144, §140.
'For example, a business which conducts frequent sales may place an extra
burden upon the police; in like manner carnivals and circuses will cause extra
expense. Heavy trucks cause greater injury to the roads than lighter motor
vehicles, and the tax upon them is accordingly greater. N. C. PuB. LAWS
(1931) c. 427, §165.
" Real estate agents, peddlers, traveling carnivals.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
gation to the state, or, if business as such owes an extra obligation, 23
the tax should be on all business.

In addition to a lack of actual equality in classification the license
system is subject to criticism as regards the measure of the tax on

enterprises within the same formal classification. In effect, when the
same tax applies to firms of diverse ability to pay this is a discrimina-

tion against the smaller firms. Some taxes are flat rates without regard to extent of activity ;24 others are graduated according to the

population of the town in which the business operates, 25 which manifestly is an inaccurate gauge of ability; other licenses are measured

by various external signs which may not be good criteria for the levying of taxes. 26

If the license tax is not imposed for revenue but for

regulation, in which the ability principle is not an important consideration, the measure should be selected with regard to the purpose in

view.
E. M.

PERKINS.

Taxation-Exemption of Property Bought with Federal War
Risk Insurance or Compensation Money.
An act of congress1 provides that the money payable to veterans
of the World War shall be exempt from "all taxation." A later section2 adds that "no sum payable under this chapter . . . shall be
subject . . . to national or state taxation." Three state supreme

'T. S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, Poc. NAT. TAx AssN. (1917)
185. "A large part of the cost of business is traceable to the necessity of maintaining a suitable environment.' ". .. business ought to be taxed because it
costs money to maintain a market and those costs should in some way be distributed over all the beneficiaries of that market'
' Of 131 license taxes in the 1931 Revenue Act, 37 are flat rates, 25 are
measured according to population, and 69 have various measuring devices such
as type and size of equipment used, gross receipts, persons accommodated,
persons employed.
At first thought net income would seem to be the most equitable and efficacious measuring device. However, administrative difficulties of a tax measured
by net income might prohibit such a device.
'Moving pictures, soda fountains, laundries, and automotive service stations
are among those measured by population. N. C. PuB. LAWS (1931) c. 427, §105,
§144, §150, §153. Obviously the individual enterprises within these groups are
of diverse profitableness.
' Various measures have been sustained. Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119
(1878) (volume of business) ; State v. Stevenson, 109 N. C. 730, 14 S. E. 385
(1891) (amount of purchases) ; Cobb v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 307, 30 S. E.
338 (1898) (gross receipts) ; State v. Carter, 129 N. C. 560, 40 S. E. 11 (1901)
(population) ; Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N. C. 604, 150 S. E. 190 (1929) (tonnage
of trucks).
143
Stat. 613 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. §454 (1928).
243
Stat. 125 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. §618 (1928).

